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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Lundahl timely appeals from the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction
and its order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency. On appeal, Mr. Lundahl
argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection
when it refused to augment the record with various transcripts Mr. Lundahl requested to
be created at the public's expense.

Mr. Lundahl also argues that the district court

abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction and denied his I.C.R. 35 motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Lundahl was charged, by Information, with driving under the influence of
alcohol (hereinafter "DUI") and a felony enhancement.

(R., pp.46-47.) Pursuant to a

plea agreement, Mr. Lundahl pleaded guilty to the DUI and the felony enhancement.
(R., pp.48-56, 63.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven
years, with two years fixed, but suspended that sentence and placed Mr. Lundahl on
probation. (R., pp.63-67.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for a bench warrant on a
probation violation, alleging that Mr. Lundahl violated various terms of his probation.
(R., pp.71-73.)

Mr. Lundahl admitted to violating the terms of his probation by driving

without a license and consuming alcohol.

(R., pp.72, 87.)

The district court then

revoked Mr. Lundahl's probation, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.91-93.) Upon review
of Mr. Lundahl's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, "rider"), the district court
relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.97-98.)
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Mr. Lundahl then filed an I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied
by the district court. (R., pp.100-101, 114-116.)
Mr. Lundahl then filed a motion requesting credit for time served, which was
granted by the district court. 1 (R., pp.119-125.)
On appeal, Mr. Lundahl's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the record
with various transcripts and to suspend the briefing schedule pending the preparation of
those transcripts.

(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and

Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.)

The State

objected to Mr. Lundahl's request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to Augment
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter,
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered
an order denying Mr. Lundahl's request for a transcript of the probation violation
hearing, held on July 13, 2010, and the probation disposition hearing, held on
August 31, 2010.

(Order Denying Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing

Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), p.1.)

1

Mr. Lundahl is not raising this as an issue on appeal.

2

ISSUES
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Lundahl due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Lundahl's I.C.R. 35
motion requesting leniency?

3

ARGUMENT

I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Lundahl Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary
Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues raised on appeal.
In this case, Mr. Lundahl filed a Motion to Augment requesting a transcript of the
probation violation hearing, held on July 13, 2010, and the probation disposition
hearing, held on August 31, 2010, wherein he argued that, when determining whether to
relinquish jurisdiction, a district court can consider all of the prior hearings. That motion
was denied by the Supreme Court. On appeal, Mr. Lundahl is challenging the Idaho
Supreme Court's denial of his request for transcripts of the probation violation hearing,
held on July 13, 2010, and the probation disposition hearing, held on August 31, 2010.
Mr. Lundahl asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issue of whether
the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction because the district
court could rely on its memory of the probation revocation hearings when it decided to
relinquish jurisdiction.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his

request.
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B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Lundahl Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With
The Necessary Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Lundahl With Access
To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because
He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His Sentencing
Claims

The constitutions of both the United States and the state of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV; IDAHO. CaNST.
art.I§13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cly., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State

V.

Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State

V.

Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution."

Maresh

V.

State,

Dept. of Health and Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
I.C. § 19-863(a).

Idaho court rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2);

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.CR. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding

before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to
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"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." !,C.R.54.7(a).
An appeal from an order relinquishing jurisdiction is an appeal of right as defined
in Idaho Appellate Rule 11. "Relief from ... [an order relinquishing jurisdiction] may
appropriately be sought through a direct appeal." State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 754 n.1
(Ct. App. 1993).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits a state's obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review.
The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In
order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the
states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of
the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
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themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as
follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. 'This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeaL" Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well established that an appellant

bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
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(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Lundahl fails to
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply
and Mr. Lundahl's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district
court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether
the transcript is relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge
gained from its own official position and observations.

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho

367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983)
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wa/lace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977)
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the
quantity of drugs therein involved");

State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984)

(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected
10

to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the
decision to relinquish jurisdiction.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
Docket No 39057, 2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation. Id. at 1.

After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the

terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 1-2.

After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on

probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and
the district court revoked probation.

The defendant appealed from the district

Id.

court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4.
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point
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this case is not final. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Mr. Lundahl is challenging
not only the order relinquishing jurisdiction, but also the denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion,
which entails an analysis of the district court's sentencing rationale.
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review, The transcripts of the probation violation hearing, held on July 13, 2010, and
the probation disposition hearing, held on August 31,2010, are relevant because Idaho
appellate courts review all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether
the court made appropriate sentencing determinations.

See State v. Hanington, 148

Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into
execution following

a period of probation, we will examine the entire record

encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon
the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).2

The

scope of review in this matter is broadened because, and as stated above, Mr. Lundahl
is also challenging the district court's denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion.

See State v.

Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Where an appeal is taken from an order

In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in
Hanington. Specifically it held:
2

In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that al!
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.

Morgan, at 4 (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan opinion is not a final opinion
and Mr. Lundahl is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal.
12

refusing to reduce a sentence under Rule 35 [the appellate court's] scope of review
includes all information submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the
subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce.").
Further support for Mr. Lundahl's position can be found in State v. Warren, 123
Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery
in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which
was ultimately revoked.

Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of

Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position,
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial.

Id.

The Court of Appeals

addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his
sentence reduction claim because he failed to provide a transcript of the original PSI
and a transcript of the original sentencing hearing.

Id.

Even though the original

sentence was not on appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue, the
Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's
claims of error. Moreover, there was no indication that a transcript of that hearing was
created before the probation violation hearing or that the district court referenced the
original sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that
the Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the
13

nature of the original offense. Had Mr. Lundahl failed to request the transcripts at issue,
the Warren opinion indicates that it would be presumed to support the district court's
decision to execute the original sentence.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Lundahl's request for the probation
violation hearing, held on July 13, 2010, and the probation disposition hearing, held on
August 31, 2010, will render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that
the missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions
as a procedural bar to the review of Mr. Lundahl's appellate sentencing claims on the
merits, and therefore, Mr. Lundahl should either be provided with the requested
transcripts or the presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Lundahl With
Access To The Requested Transcripts Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell:
the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to
make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [to] hold
otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted
to, "that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in
14

the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may
disregard,"
Id, at 71-72.

In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Doug/as was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U,S. at 397.

The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements

of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Lundahl has not obtained
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review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. These standards offer insight into
the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel.

Regarding appellate counsel, the

standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence. . .. Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to relinquish jurisdiction. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Lundahl on
the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Lundahl is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Lundahl his

constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
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to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
Mr. Lundahl argues that under any view of the facts, the district court abused its
discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction. The decision to relinquish jurisdiction lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Rhoades, 122 Idaho 837, 837 (Ct.
App. 1992).
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the
inquiry is: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). Mr. Lundahl does not contest whether the
district court appropriately perceived its ability to relinquish jurisdiction as one of
discretion.

Mr. Lundahl argues that the district court did not exercise that discretion

based on the appropriate legal standards and that the district court failed to exercise
reason when relinquishing jurisdiction.
As a preliminary note, Mr. Lundahl incorporates the mitigating information
contained in Section III, infra, herein by this reference.
Mr. Lundahl's rider performance was not that bad despite the fact that the
Addendum to Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI) recommended the
district court to relinquish jurisdiction. According to Mr. Lundahl, he was surprised he
was considered aggressive.

(Tr., p.50, Ls.19-22. p.52, Ls.8-11.)

Mr. Lindahl's

perceived aggressiveness might have been attributable to the changes the State made
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to his medications while on his rider.

(Tr., p.51, Ls.17-23.)

Mr. Lundahl also had

problems which were caused by Idaho Department of Corrections (hereinafter, IDOC)
staff changes, which prevented him from developing a trusting relationship with his
treatment providers. (Tr., p.50, L.22 - p.52, L.7.) Despite these setbacks, Mr. Lundahl
was considered a "serious student" in his creative writing course and "always gave
100%."

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.117.)

In fact,

Mr. Lundahl thought he was being respectful to staff and he completed a lot of the
programming. (Tr., p.52, Ls.11-17; PSI, p.111.)
In sum, Mr. Lundahl's negative rider performance was partially attributable to
factors outside his control. However, he did succeed in some of his programming.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Lundahl's I.C.R. 35 Motion
Requesting Leniency In light Of The IDOC's Inability To Coordinate His Mental Health
Treatment With His Programming
Mr. Lundahl argues that the unified sentence of seven years, with two years
fixed, is unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of the mitigating factors present in this
matter. A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under I.C.R. 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.
1987)). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same
as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
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protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting

State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).

Mr. Lundahl does not allege that his

sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion, Mr. Lundahl must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under
Rule 35, [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). "If the sentence was not
excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view
of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction."

State v.

Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006).

As a preliminary note, Mr. Lundahl incorporates the mitigating information
contained in Section II of this brief herein by this reference.
Mr. Lundahl provided new information in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion.
Mr. Lundahl filed a supplement to his I.C.R. 35 motion, which indicated that a treatment
provider concluded that he needed to be stabilized on medications for three months
before beginning his programming. (R., p.106.) Mr. Lundahl also indicated that he was
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not mentally stable when he began the programming.

(R., p.106.)

Mr. Lundahl

provided additional information detailing the various medications he was exposed to
while on his rider, and how they made him frustrated and agitated.

(R., p.i07.)

However, Mr. Lundahl was eventually stabilized and, from that point on, he performed
well on his rider.

(R., pp.1 07-1 OB.) Therefore, IDOC's failure to adequately stabilize

Mr. Lundahl should not have been used against him.
Additionally, there were mitigating factors before the district court at the time of
sentencing which, when viewed in light of the new information, provide further support
for the conclusion that Mr. Lundahl's sentence is excessive. Specifically, Mr. Lundahl's
educational background is a mitigating factor.

Prior to sentencing, Mr. Lundahl was

planning to enroll for his junior year of college at Boise State University. (Tr., p.15, L.23
- p.16, L.7; PSI, p.B.) "He was in a program to become a physician's assistant." (Tr.,
pA9, Ls.7-B.) According to trial counsel, "[t]he best thing for him is to be back in school,
not prison." (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-12.) One of his professors stated that Mr. Lundahl "is very
bright and capable of succeeding." (PSI, p.34.) 3
Additionally, Mr. Lundahl's abuse as a child is a mitigating factor. Mr. Lundahl's
parents fought often when he was growing up. (PSI, pp.6-7.) Mr. Lundahl was also a
direct victim of this environment.

(PSI, pp.6-7.)

According to the presentence

investigator, "[c]learly, the defendant was raised in a home riddled with abuse." (PSI,
p.13.)

At the age of five, Mr. Lundahl had to call 911 to report that his father was

abusing his mother with a weight-lifting belt. (pSI, p.3B.) At the Age of 11, Mr. Lundahl
had to use golf clubs to stop his father from strangling his mother. (PSI, p.39.) When

3 The citations to the PSI and the attached exhibits adhere to the pagination of the
electronic PDF file.
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Mr. Lundahl was sixteen, his father pinned him to the ground and punched him in the
head approximately fifteen times. (PSI, p.43.)
Additionally,

Mr.

Lundahl's

mental

Mr. Lundahl suffers from PTSD and ADHD.

health

issues are

(PSI, p.10.)

mitigating factors.

Mr. Lundahl's PTSD was

caused by his childhood relationship with his father. (PSI, pp.13, 35.) Mr. Lundahl uses
alcohol as a means to relieve the symptoms of his PTSD. (PSI, p.46.)
Further, Mr. Lundahl's remorse is a mitigating factor.

Mr. Lundahl expressed

remorse for his behavior. (PSI, p.2.) He also attended a victim's panel and realized
how serious his actions were and how grateful he was that no one was injured. (PSI,
p.2.)
Finally, the fact that this is Mr. Lundahl's first felony conviction is also a mitigating
factor. (PSI, p.13.)
In sum, it was recommended that Mr. Lundahl be stabilized on his medications
before beginning his rider. However, this did not occur and he was exposed to a myriad
of medications before he was stabilized. It was during that period of time that he had
problems on his rider. After he was stabilized he performed well. When this is taken
into consideration along with the other mitigating factors present in this matter, it
supports the conclusion that Mr. Lundahl's sentence is excessively harsh.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Lundahl

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district
court to place him on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Lundahl respectfully requests that
this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2012.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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